5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
a94485b138 Address code review findings across all phases
Phase 1 fixes:
- W-01: Add start_period: 30s to backend healthcheck for migration window
- W-03: Narrow .dockerignore *.md to specific files (preserve alembic/README)

Phase 2 fixes:
- C-01: Wrap Argon2id calls in totp.py (disable, regenerate, backup verify,
  backup store) — missed in initial AC-2 pass
- S-01: Extract async wrappers (ahash_password, averify_password,
  averify_password_with_upgrade) into services/auth.py, refactor all
  callers to use them instead of manual run_in_executor boilerplate
- W-01: Fix ntfy dedup regression — commit per category instead of per-user
  to preserve dedup records if a later category fails

Phase 4 fixes:
- C-01: Fix optimistic drag-and-drop cache key to include date range
- C-02: Replace toISOString() with format() to avoid UTC date shift in
  visible range calculation
- W-02: Initialize visibleRange from current month to eliminate unscoped
  first fetch + immediate refetch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-13 00:19:33 +08:00
21aa670a39 Extract real client IP from proxy headers instead of Docker bridge IP
Nginx already forwards X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP, but the backend
read request.client.host directly — always returning 172.18.0.x. Added
get_client_ip() helper to audit service; updated all 13 call sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-01 19:20:07 +08:00
2f58282c31 M-01+M-03: Add input validation and extra=forbid to all request schemas
- Add max_length constraints to all string fields in request schemas,
  matching DB column limits (title:255, description:5000, etc.)
- Add min_length=1 to required name/title fields
- Add ConfigDict(extra="forbid") to all request schemas to reject
  unknown fields (prevents silent field injection)
- Add Path(ge=1, le=2147483647) to all integer path parameters across
  all routers to prevent integer overflow → 500 errors
- Add max_length to TOTP inline schemas (code:6, mfa_token:256, etc.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 15:43:55 +08:00
464b8b911f Phase 8: Registration flow & MFA enforcement UI
- backend: add POST /auth/totp/enforce-setup and /auth/totp/enforce-confirm
  endpoints that operate on mfa_enforce_token (not session cookie), generate
  TOTP secret/QR/backup codes, verify confirmation code, enable TOTP, clear
  mfa_enforce_pending flag, and issue a full session cookie
- frontend: expand LockScreen to five modes — login, first-run setup,
  open registration, TOTP challenge, MFA enforcement setup (QR -> verify ->
  backup codes), and forced password change; all modes share AmbientBackground
  and the existing card layout; registration visible only when
  authStatus.registration_open is true

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 18:39:18 +08:00
b134ad9e8b Implement Stage 6 Track B: TOTP MFA (pyotp, Fernet-encrypted secrets, backup codes)
- models/totp_usage.py: replay-prevention table, unique on (user_id, code, window)
- models/backup_code.py: Argon2id-hashed recovery codes with used_at tracking
- services/totp.py: Fernet encrypt/decrypt, verify_totp_code returns actual window, QR base64, backup code generation
- routers/totp.py: setup (idempotent), confirm, totp-verify (mfa_token + TOTP or backup code), disable, regenerate, status
- alembic/024: creates totp_usage and backup_codes tables
- main.py: register totp router, import new models for Alembic discovery
- requirements.txt: add pyotp>=2.9.0, qrcode[pil]>=7.4.0, cryptography>=42.0.0
- jobs/notifications.py: periodic cleanup for totp_usage (5 min) and expired user_sessions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 04:18:05 +08:00