43 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ed98924716 Action remaining QA suggestions + performance optimizations
S-02: Extract extract_credential_raw_id() helper in services/passkey.py
  — replaces 2 inline rawId parsing blocks in passkeys.py
S-03: Add PasskeyLoginResponse type, use in useAuth passkeyLoginMutation
S-04: Add Cancel button to disable-passwordless dialog
W-03: Invalidate auth queries on disable ceremony error/cancel

Perf-2: Session cap uses ID-only query + bulk UPDATE instead of loading
  full ORM objects and flipping booleans individually
Perf-3: Remove passkey_count from /auth/status hot path (polled every
  15s). Use EXISTS for has_passkeys boolean. Count derived from passkeys
  list query in PasskeySection (passkeys.length).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 02:34:00 +08:00
0a8e163e47 Fix QA review findings: 2 critical, 3 warnings, 1 suggestion
C-01: Initialize config=None before conditional in auth/status to
prevent NameError on fresh instance (setup_required=True path)

C-02: Use generic "Authentication failed" on passkey lockout trigger
instead of leaking lockout state (consistent with F-02 remediation)

W-01: Add nginx rate limit for /api/auth/passkeys/passwordless
endpoints (enable accepts password — brute force protection)

W-02: Call record_successful_login in passkey unlock path to reset
failed_login_count (prevents unexpected lockout accumulation)

W-05: Auto-clear must_change_password on passkey login — user can't
provide old password in forced-change form after passkey auth

S-01: Pin webauthn to >=2.1.0,<3 (prevent major version breakage)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 02:27:16 +08:00
44e6c8e3e5 Fix 3 pentest findings: lockout status disclosure, timing side-channel, XFF trust scope
F-01 (passkeys.py): Add constant-time DB no-op on login/begin when username not
found. Without it the absent credential-fetch query makes the "no user" path
measurably faster, leaking username existence via timing.

F-02 (session.py, auth.py, passkeys.py, totp.py): Change check_account_lockout
from HTTP 423 to 401 — status-code analysis can no longer distinguish a locked
account from an invalid credential. record_failed_login now returns remaining
attempt count; callers use it for progressive UX warnings (<=3 attempts left,
and on the locking attempt) without changing the 401 status code visible to
attackers. Session-lock 423 path in get_current_user is unaffected.

F-03 (nginx.conf): Replace set_real_ip_from 0.0.0.0/0 with RFC 1918 ranges
(172.16.0.0/12, 10.0.0.0/8) to prevent external clients from spoofing
X-Forwarded-For to bypass rate limiting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 01:01:19 +08:00
1b868ba503 Fix: hide passwordless toggle when disabled, remove lock auto-trigger
1. Passwordless toggle in Settings is now hidden when admin hasn't
   enabled allow_passwordless in system config (or when user already
   has it enabled — so they can still disable it). Backend exposes
   allow_passwordless in /auth/status response.

2. Remove auto-trigger passkey ceremony on lock screen — previously
   fired immediately when session locked for passwordless users.
   Now waits for user to click "Unlock with passkey" button.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 00:32:03 +08:00
bcfebbc9ae feat(backend): Phase 1 passwordless login — migration, models, toggle endpoints, unlock, delete guard, admin controls
- Migration 062: adds users.passwordless_enabled and system_config.allow_passwordless (both default false)
- User model: passwordless_enabled field after must_change_password
- SystemConfig model: allow_passwordless field after enforce_mfa_new_users
- auth.py login(): block passwordless-enabled accounts from password login path (403) with audit log
- auth.py auth_status(): change has_passkeys query to full COUNT, add passkey_count + passwordless_enabled to response
- auth.py get_current_user(): add /api/auth/passkeys/login/begin and /login/complete to lock_exempt set
- passkeys.py: add PasswordlessEnableRequest + PasswordlessDisableRequest schemas
- passkeys.py: PUT /passwordless/enable — verify password, check system config, require >= 2 passkeys, set flag
- passkeys.py: POST /passwordless/disable/begin — generate user-bound challenge for passkey auth ceremony
- passkeys.py: PUT /passwordless/disable — verify passkey auth response, clear flag, update sign count
- passkeys.py: PasskeyLoginCompleteRequest.unlock field — passkey re-auth into locked session without new session
- passkeys.py: delete guard — 409 if passwordless user attempts to drop below 2 passkeys
- schemas/admin.py: add passwordless_enabled to UserListItem + UserDetailResponse; add allow_passwordless to SystemConfigResponse + SystemConfigUpdate; add TogglePasswordlessRequest
- admin.py: PUT /users/{user_id}/passwordless — admin-only disable (enabled=False only), revokes all sessions, audit log
- admin.py: update_system_config handles allow_passwordless field

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 00:15:39 +08:00
ab84c7bc53 Fix review findings: transaction atomicity, perf, and UI polish
Backend fixes:
- session.py: record_failed/successful_login use flush() not commit()
  — callers own transaction boundary (BUG-2 atomicity fix)
- auth.py: Add explicit commits after record_failed_login where callers
  raise immediately; add commit before TOTP mfa_token return path
- passkeys.py: JOIN credential+user lookup in login/complete (W-1 perf)
- passkeys.py: Move mfa_enforce_pending clear before main commit (S-2)
- passkeys.py: Add Path(ge=1, le=2147483647) on DELETE endpoint (BUG-3)
- auth.py: Switch has_passkeys from COUNT to EXISTS with LIMIT 1 (W-2)
- passkey.py: Add single-worker nonce cache comment (H-1)

Frontend fixes:
- PasskeySection: emerald→green badge colors (W-3 palette)
- PasskeySection: text-[11px]/text-[10px]→text-xs (W-4 a11y minimum)
- PasskeySection: Scope deleteMutation.isPending to per-item (W-5)
- nginx.conf: Permissions-Policy publickey-credentials use (self) (H-2)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-17 22:59:59 +08:00
e8e3f62ff8 Phase 1: Add passkey (WebAuthn/FIDO2) backend
New files:
- models/passkey_credential.py: PasskeyCredential model with indexed credential_id
- alembic 061: Create passkey_credentials table
- services/passkey.py: Challenge token management (itsdangerous + nonce replay
  protection) and py_webauthn wrappers for registration/authentication
- routers/passkeys.py: 6 endpoints (register begin/complete, login begin/complete,
  list, delete) with full security hardening

Changes:
- config.py: WEBAUTHN_RP_ID, RP_NAME, ORIGIN, CHALLENGE_TTL settings
- main.py: Mount passkey router, add CSRF exemptions for login endpoints
- auth.py: Add has_passkeys to /auth/status response
- nginx.conf: Rate limiting on all passkey endpoints, Permissions-Policy
  updated for publickey-credentials-get/create
- requirements.txt: Add webauthn>=2.1.0

Security: password re-entry for registration (V-02), single-use nonce
challenges (V-01), constant-time login/begin (V-03), shared lockout
counter, generic 401 errors, audit logging on all events.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-17 22:46:00 +08:00
eebb34aa77 Phase 0: Consolidate session creation into shared service
Extract _create_db_session, _set_session_cookie, _check_account_lockout,
_record_failed_login, and _record_successful_login from auth.py into
services/session.py. Update totp.py to use shared service instead of
its duplicate _create_full_session (which lacked session cap enforcement).

Also fixes:
- auth/status N+1 query (2 sequential queries -> single JOIN)
- Rename verify_password route to verify_password_endpoint (shadow fix)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-17 22:40:46 +08:00
a94485b138 Address code review findings across all phases
Phase 1 fixes:
- W-01: Add start_period: 30s to backend healthcheck for migration window
- W-03: Narrow .dockerignore *.md to specific files (preserve alembic/README)

Phase 2 fixes:
- C-01: Wrap Argon2id calls in totp.py (disable, regenerate, backup verify,
  backup store) — missed in initial AC-2 pass
- S-01: Extract async wrappers (ahash_password, averify_password,
  averify_password_with_upgrade) into services/auth.py, refactor all
  callers to use them instead of manual run_in_executor boilerplate
- W-01: Fix ntfy dedup regression — commit per category instead of per-user
  to preserve dedup records if a later category fails

Phase 4 fixes:
- C-01: Fix optimistic drag-and-drop cache key to include date range
- C-02: Replace toISOString() with format() to avoid UTC date shift in
  visible range calculation
- W-02: Initialize visibleRange from current month to eliminate unscoped
  first fetch + immediate refetch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-13 00:19:33 +08:00
846019d5c1 Phase 3: Backend queries and indexes optimization
- AW-1: Add composite index on calendar_members(user_id, status) for the
  hot shared-calendar polling query
- AS-6: Add composite index on ntfy_sent(user_id, sent_at) for dedup lookups
- AW-5: Combine get_user_permission into single LEFT JOIN query instead of
  2 sequential queries (called twice per event edit)
- AC-5: Batch cascade_on_disconnect — single GROUP BY + bulk UPDATE instead
  of N per-calendar checks when a connection is severed
- AW-6: Collapse admin dashboard 5 COUNT queries into single conditional
  aggregation using COUNT().filter()
- AC-3: Cache get_current_settings in request.state to avoid redundant
  queries when multiple dependencies need settings in the same request

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-13 00:08:45 +08:00
1f2083ee61 Phase 2: Backend critical path optimizations
- AC-1: Merge get_current_user into single JOIN query (session + user in
  one round-trip instead of two sequential queries per request)
- AC-2: Wrap all Argon2id hash/verify calls in run_in_executor to avoid
  blocking the async event loop (~150ms per operation)
- AW-7: Add connection pool config (pool_size=10, pool_pre_ping=True,
  pool_recycle=1800) to prevent connection exhaustion under load
- AC-4: Batch-fetch tasks in reorder_tasks with IN clause instead of
  N sequential queries during Kanban drag operations
- AW-4: Bulk NtfySent inserts with single commit per user instead of
  per-notification commits in the dispatch job

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-13 00:05:54 +08:00
3d7166740e Fix lock screen flash, theme flicker, and lock state gating
Gate dashboard rendering on isLockResolved to prevent content flash
before lock state is known. Remove animate-fade-in from LockOverlay
so it renders instantly. Always write accent color to localStorage
(even default cyan) to prevent theme flash on reload. Resolve lock
state on auth query error to avoid permanent blank screen. Lift
mobileOpen state above lock gate to survive lock/unlock cycles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 19:56:05 +08:00
89519a6dd3 Fix lock screen bypass, theme flicker, skeleton flash, and sidebar click target
Critical: Lock state was purely React useState — refreshing the page reset it.
Now persisted server-side via is_locked/locked_at columns on user_sessions.
POST /auth/lock sets the flag, /auth/verify-password clears it, and
GET /auth/status returns is_locked so the frontend initializes correctly.

UI: Cache accent color in localStorage and apply via inline script in
index.html before React hydrates to eliminate the cyan flash on load.

UI: Increase TanStack Query gcTime from 5min to 30min so page data
survives component unmount/remount across tab switches without skeleton.

UI: Move Projects nav onClick from the icon element to the full-width
container div so the entire row is clickable when the sidebar is collapsed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 19:00:55 +08:00
66cc1a0457 Action QA findings: refactor sync to accept resolved values
C-01: sync_birthday_to_contacts now accepts (share_birthday, date_of_birth)
      directly — no internal re-query, no stale-read risk with autoflush.
W-01: Eliminated redundant User/Settings SELECTs inside the service.
W-02: Removed scalar_one() on User query (no longer queries internally).
W-03: Settings router only syncs when share_birthday value actually changes.
S-02: Added logger.info with rowcount for observability.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-07 06:13:21 +08:00
8aec5a5078 Sync birthday to umbral contacts on DOB or share_birthday change
When a user updates their date of birth or toggles share_birthday,
all linked Person records (where linked_user_id matches) are updated.
If share_birthday is off, the birthday is cleared on linked records.
Virtual birthday events auto-reflect the change on next calendar poll.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-07 06:01:35 +08:00
c8805ee4c4 Fix registration enumeration + contact detail panel name sync
M-01: Unify registration error messages to prevent username/email
enumeration — both now return the same generic message.

Bug fix: Contact detail panel header and initials now use shared_fields
for umbral contacts instead of stale Person record first_name/last_name.
The table list already did this via sf() helper; the detail panel header
and getPersonInitialsName were bypassing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-06 00:31:10 +08:00
6130d09ae8 Make umbral name editable in user settings
- Add umbral_name to ProfileUpdate schema with regex validation
- Add uniqueness check in PUT /auth/profile handler
- Replace disabled input with editable save-on-blur field in Social card
- Client-side validation (3-50 chars, alphanumeric/hyphens/underscores)
- Inline error display for validation failures and taken names

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-04 05:00:33 +08:00
8e226fee0f Set umbral_name=username on all user creation paths
Admin create, first-user setup, and registration endpoints were
missing umbral_name assignment, causing NOT NULL constraint failures
when creating new users after migration 039.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-04 04:56:22 +08:00
e8109cef6b Add required email + date of birth to registration, shared validators, partial index
- S-01: Extract _EMAIL_REGEX, _validate_email_format, _validate_name_field
  shared helpers in schemas/auth.py — used by RegisterRequest, ProfileUpdate,
  and admin.CreateUserRequest (eliminates 3x duplicated regex)
- S-04: Migration 038 replaces plain unique constraint on email with a
  partial unique index WHERE email IS NOT NULL
- Email is now required on registration (was optional)
- Date of birth is now required on registration, editable in settings
- User model gains date_of_birth (Date, nullable) column
- ProfileUpdate/ProfileResponse include date_of_birth
- Registration form adds required Email, Date of Birth fields
- Settings Profile card adds Date of Birth input (save-on-blur)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 19:21:11 +08:00
02efe04fc4 Fix QA critical/warning findings on profile feature
C-01: Replace setattr loop with explicit field assignment in update_profile
C-02: Fix useEffect dependency to profileQuery.dataUpdatedAt for re-sync
W-01: Add audit log entry for profile updates
W-02: Use less misleading generic error for email uniqueness on registration
W-03: Early return on empty PUT body to avoid unnecessary commit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 19:09:15 +08:00
45f3788fb0 Add preferred name + email to registration, profile card to settings
Registration form now collects optional preferred_name and email fields.
Settings page Profile card expanded with first name, last name, and email
(editable via new GET/PUT /api/auth/profile endpoints). Email uniqueness
enforced on both registration and profile update. No migrations needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 19:02:42 +08:00
ab7e4a7c7e Backend pentest remediation (PT-03/05/06/07)
PT-03: Make UMBRA_URL configurable via env var (default http://localhost).
Replaces hardcoded http://10.0.69.35 in notification dispatch job and
ntfy test endpoint. Add UMBRA_URL to .env.example.

PT-05: Add explicit path="/" to session cookie for clarity.

PT-06: Add concurrent session limit (MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER, default 10).
When exceeded, oldest sessions are revoked. New login always succeeds.

PT-07: Escape LIKE metacharacters (%, _) in admin audit log action
filter to prevent wildcard abuse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-02 17:43:27 +08:00
21aa670a39 Extract real client IP from proxy headers instead of Docker bridge IP
Nginx already forwards X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP, but the backend
read request.client.host directly — always returning 172.18.0.x. Added
get_client_ip() helper to audit service; updated all 13 call sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-01 19:20:07 +08:00
d269742aa2 Fix pentest findings: setup 500 error + password reuse prevention
- L-01: Setup endpoint used scalar_one_or_none() on unbounded User
  query, throwing 500 MultipleResultsFound when >1 user exists.
  Replaced with select(func.count()) for a reliable check.
- L-02: Change-password allowed reusing the same password, defeating
  must_change_password enforcement. Added equality check before
  accepting the new password.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-28 02:42:00 +08:00
1aeb725410 Fix issues from QA review: hash upgrade ordering, interceptor scope, guard
- W-01: Move is_active check before hash upgrade so disabled accounts
  don't get their password hash silently mutated on rejected login
- W-02: Narrow interceptor exclusion to specific auth endpoints instead
  of blanket /auth/* prefix (future-proofs against new auth routes)
- W-03: Add null guard on optimistic setQueryData to handle undefined
  cache gracefully instead of spreading undefined
- S-01: Clear loginError when switching from register back to login mode
- S-03: Add detail dict to auth.login_blocked_inactive audit event

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-28 02:13:48 +08:00
b2d81f7015 Block inactive user login + fix login flicker + inline error alerts
- Backend: reject is_active=False users with HTTP 403 after password
  verification but before session creation (prevents last_login_at
  update, lockout reset, and MFA token issuance for disabled accounts)
- Frontend: optimistic setQueryData on successful login eliminates the
  form flash between mutation success and auth query refetch
- LockScreen: replace lockoutMessage + toast.error with unified
  loginError inline alert for 401/403/423 responses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-28 01:21:06 +08:00
8582b41b03 Add user profile fields + IAM search, email column, detail panel
Backend:
- Migration 037: add email, first_name, last_name to users table
- User model: add 3 profile columns
- Admin schemas: extend UserListItem/UserDetailResponse/CreateUserRequest
  with profile fields, email validator, name field sanitization
- _create_user_defaults: accept optional preferred_name kwarg
- POST /users: set profile fields, email uniqueness check, IntegrityError guard
- GET /users/{id}: join Settings for preferred_name, include must_change_password/locked_until

Frontend:
- AdminUser/AdminUserDetail types: add profile + detail fields
- useAdmin: add CreateUserPayload profile fields + useAdminUserDetail query
- CreateUserDialog: optional profile section (first/last name, email, preferred name)
- IAMPage: search bar filtering on username/email/name, email column in table,
  row click to select user with accent highlight
- UserDetailSection: two-column detail panel (User Info + Security & Permissions)
  with inline role editing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 22:40:20 +08:00
48e15fa677 UX polish for delete-user: username toast, hide self-delete
S-03: Delete toast now shows the deleted username from the API response
S-04: Delete button hidden for the current admin's own row (backend
still guards with 403, but no reason to show a dead button)

Adds username to auth status response so the frontend can identify
the current user.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 19:30:43 +08:00
1ebc41b9d7 L-03: Session 7-day sliding window with 30-day hard ceiling
Reduce session expiry from 30 days to 7 days of inactivity while
preserving a 30-day absolute token lifetime for itsdangerous:

- SESSION_MAX_AGE_DAYS=7: sliding window for DB expires_at + cookie
- SESSION_TOKEN_HARD_CEILING_DAYS=30: itsdangerous max_age (prevents
  rejecting renewed tokens whose creation timestamp exceeds 7 days)
- get_current_user: silently extends expires_at and re-issues cookie
  when >1 day has elapsed since last renewal
- Active users never notice; 7 days of inactivity forces re-login;
  30-day absolute ceiling forces re-login regardless of activity

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 15:45:15 +08:00
8e27f2920b M-02: Timing-safe login prevents username enumeration
When a login targets a non-existent username, run Argon2id against a
pre-computed dummy hash so response time (~60ms) matches wrong-password
attempts. Also reorder the login flow to run verify_password_with_upgrade
BEFORE the lockout check, preventing timing side-channels that could
distinguish locked accounts from wrong passwords.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 15:44:27 +08:00
619e220622 Fix QA review #2: W-03/W-04, S-01 through S-04
W-03: Unify split transactions — _create_db_session() now uses flush()
      instead of commit(), callers own the final commit.
W-04: Time-bound dedup key fetch to 7-day purge window.
S-01: Type admin dashboard response with RecentLoginItem/RecentAuditItem.
S-02: Convert starred events index to partial index WHERE is_starred = true.
S-03: EventTemplate.created_at default changed to func.now() for consistency.
S-04: Add single-worker scaling note to weather cache.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 05:41:16 +08:00
e57a5b00c9 Fix QA review findings: C-01 through C-04, W-01 through W-07, S-01/S-04/S-05/S-06
Critical fixes:
- C-01: Pass user_id to _mark_sent/_already_sent (ntfy crash)
- C-02: Align frontend HTTP methods with backend routes (PATCH->PUT,
  DELETE->POST, fix reset-password/enforce-mfa/disable-mfa paths)
- C-03: Add X-Requested-With to CORS allow_headers
- C-04: Replace scalar_one_or_none with func.count for auth/status

Warning fixes:
- W-01: Batch audit log into same transaction in create_user, setup, register
- W-02: Extract users array from UserListResponse wrapper in useAdminUsers
- W-03: Update password hint from "8 chars" to "12 chars" in CreateUserDialog
- W-04: Remove password input from reset flow, show returned temp password
- W-06: Remove unused actor_alias variable in admin_dashboard
- W-07: Resolve usernames in dashboard audit entries via JOIN, remove
  ip_address column from recent_logins (not tracked on User model)

Suggestions applied:
- S-01/S-06: Add extra="forbid" to all admin mutation schemas
- S-04: Add ondelete="SET NULL" to audit_log.actor_user_id FK
- S-05: Improve registration error message for better UX

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 19:19:04 +08:00
d8bdae8ec3 Implement multi-user RBAC: database, auth, routing, admin API (Phases 1-6)
Phase 1: Add role, mfa_enforce_pending, must_change_password to users table.
Create system_config (singleton) and audit_log tables. Migration 026.

Phase 2: Add user_id FK to all 8 data tables (todos, reminders, projects,
calendars, people, locations, event_templates, ntfy_sent) with 4-step
nullable→backfill→FK→NOT NULL pattern. Migrations 027-034.

Phase 3: Harden auth schemas (extra="forbid" on RegisterRequest), add
MFA enforcement token serializer with distinct salt, rewrite auth router
with require_role() factory and registration endpoint.

Phase 4: Scope all 12 routers by user_id, fix dependency type bugs,
bound weather cache (SEC-15), multi-user ntfy dispatch.

Phase 5: Create admin router (14 endpoints), admin schemas, audit
service, rate limiting in nginx. SEC-08 CSRF via X-Requested-With.

Phase 6: Update frontend types, useAuth hook (role/isAdmin/register),
App.tsx (AdminRoute guard), Sidebar (admin link), api.ts (XHR header).

Security findings addressed: SEC-01, SEC-02, SEC-03, SEC-04, SEC-05,
SEC-06, SEC-07, SEC-08, SEC-12, SEC-13, SEC-15.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 19:06:25 +08:00
a0b50a2b13 Remediate pentest findings F-01, F-02, F-06
- Remove ineffective in-memory IP rate limiter from auth.py (F-01):
  nginx limit_req_zone handles real-IP throttling, DB lockout is the per-user guard
- Block RFC 1918 + IPv6 ULA ranges in ntfy SSRF guard (F-02):
  prevents requests to Docker-internal services via user-controlled ntfy URL
- Rate-limit /api/auth/setup at nginx with burst=3 (F-06)
- Document production deployment checklist in .env.example (F-03/F-04/F-05)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 02:25:37 +08:00
72075b7b71 Address QA review warnings for pentest remediation
- Clear IP failure counter on successful /change-password (W-01)
- Add nginx rate limiting for /api/auth/totp-verify (W-02)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 20:15:21 +08:00
f372e7bd99 Harden infrastructure: address 7 pentest findings
- Remove external backend port 8000 exposure (VULN-01)
- Conditionally disable Swagger/ReDoc/OpenAPI in non-dev (VULN-01)
- Suppress nginx and uvicorn server version headers (VULN-07)
- Fix CSP to allow Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com/gstatic) (VULN-08)
- Add nginx rate limiting on auth endpoints (10r/m burst=5) (VULN-09)
- Block dotfile access (/.env, /.git) while preserving .well-known (VULN-10)
- Make CORS origins configurable, tighten methods/headers (VULN-11)
- Run both containers as non-root users (VULN-12)
- Add IP rate limit + account lockout to /change-password

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 19:57:29 +08:00
5ad0a610bd Address all QA review warnings and suggestions for lock screen feature
- [C-1] Add rate limiting and account lockout to /verify-password endpoint
- [W-3] Add max length validator (128 chars) to VerifyPasswordRequest
- [W-1] Move activeMutations to ref in useLock to prevent timer thrashing
- [W-5] Add user_id field to frontend Settings interface
- [S-1] Export auth schemas from schemas registry
- [S-3] Add aria-label to LockOverlay password input

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 18:20:42 +08:00
b0af07c270 Add lock screen, auto-lock timeout, and login visual upgrade
- Backend: POST /verify-password endpoint for lock screen re-auth,
  auto_lock_enabled/auto_lock_minutes columns on Settings with migration 025
- Frontend: LockProvider context with idle detection (throttled activity
  listeners, pauses during mutations), Lock button in sidebar, full-screen
  LockOverlay with password re-entry and "Switch account" option
- Settings: Security card with auto-lock toggle and configurable timeout (1-60 min)
- Visual: Upgraded login screen with large title, animated floating gradient
  orbs (3 drift keyframes), subtle grid overlay, shared AmbientBackground component

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 10:03:12 +08:00
4a98b67b0b Address all QA review warnings and suggestions for entity pages
- W1: Add ntfy_has_token property to Settings model for safe from_attributes usage
- W2: Eager-load event location and pass location_name to ntfy template builder
- W3: Add missing accent color swatches (red, pink, yellow) to match backend Literal
- W7: Cap IP rate-limit dict at 10k entries with stale-entry purge to prevent OOM
- W9: Include user_id in SettingsResponse for multi-user readiness

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 07:48:45 +08:00
fbc452a004 Implement Stage 6 Track A: PIN → Username/Password auth migration
- New User model (username, argon2id password_hash, totp fields, lockout)
- New UserSession model (DB-backed revocation, replaces in-memory set)
- New services/auth.py: Argon2id hashing, bcrypt→Argon2id upgrade path, URLSafeTimedSerializer session/MFA tokens
- New schemas/auth.py: SetupRequest, LoginRequest, ChangePasswordRequest with OWASP password strength validation
- Full rewrite of routers/auth.py: setup/login/logout/status/change-password with account lockout (10 failures → 30-min, HTTP 423), IP rate limiting retained as outer layer, get_current_user + get_current_settings dependencies replacing get_current_session
- Settings model: drop pin_hash, add user_id FK (nullable for migration)
- Schemas/settings.py: remove SettingsCreate, ChangePinRequest, _validate_pin_length
- Settings router: rewrite to use get_current_user + get_current_settings, preserve ntfy test endpoint
- All 11 consumer routers updated: auth-gate-only routers use get_current_user, routers reading Settings fields use get_current_settings
- config.py: add SESSION_MAX_AGE_DAYS, MFA_TOKEN_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, TOTP_ISSUER
- main.py: import User and UserSession models for Alembic discovery
- requirements.txt: add argon2-cffi>=23.1.0
- Migration 023: create users + user_sessions tables, migrate pin_hash → User row (admin), backfill settings.user_id, drop pin_hash

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-25 04:12:37 +08:00
27c65ce40d Fix Round 2 code review findings: type safety, security, and correctness
Backend:
- Add Literal types for status/priority fields (project_task, todo, project schemas)
- Add AccentColor Literal validation to prevent CSS injection (settings schema)
- Add PIN max-length (72 char bcrypt limit) validation
- Fix event date filtering to use correct range overlap logic
- Add revocation check to auth_status endpoint for consistency
- Config: env-aware SECRET_KEY fail-fast, configurable COOKIE_SECURE

Frontend:
- Add withCredentials to axios for cross-origin cookie support
- Replace .toISOString() with local date formatter in DashboardPage
- Replace `as any` casts with proper indexed type access in forms
- Nginx: add CSP, Referrer-Policy headers; remove deprecated X-XSS-Protection
- Nginx: duplicate security headers in static asset location block

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-16 15:18:49 +08:00
1aaa2b3a74 Fix code review findings: security hardening and frontend fixes
Backend:
- Add rate limiting to login (5 attempts / 5 min window)
- Add secure flag to session cookies with helper function
- Add PIN min-length validation via Pydantic field_validator
- Fix naive datetime usage in todos.py (datetime.now() not UTC)
- Disable SQLAlchemy echo in production
- Remove auto-commit from get_db to prevent double commits
- Add lower bound filter to upcoming events query
- Add SECRET_KEY default warning on startup
- Remove create_all from lifespan (Alembic handles migrations)

Frontend:
- Fix ReminderForm remind_at slice for datetime-local input
- Add window.confirm() dialogs on all destructive actions
- Redirect authenticated users away from login screen
- Replace error: any with getErrorMessage helper in LockScreen

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-16 07:49:21 +08:00
1f6519635f Initial commit 2026-02-15 16:13:41 +08:00