Address QA review: model registry, NOT NULL constraint, variable naming, toggle defaults, lockout UX

- C3: Register User, UserSession, NtfySent, TOTPUsage, BackupCode in models/__init__.py
- C4: Enforce settings.user_id NOT NULL after backfill in migration 023, update model
- W4: Rename misleading current_user → current_settings in dashboard.py
- W5: Match NtfySettingsSection initial state defaults to backend (true/1/2)
- W8: Clear lockout banner on username/password input change in LockScreen

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

backend/alembic/versions/023_auth_migration_users_sessions.py

@@ -119,7 +119,12 @@ def upgrade() -> None:
         )
 
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
-    # 6. Drop pin_hash from settings — data now lives in users.password_hash
+    # 6. Enforce NOT NULL on user_id now that backfill is complete
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    op.alter_column('settings', 'user_id', nullable=False)
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # 7. Drop pin_hash from settings — data now lives in users.password_hash
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------
     op.drop_column('settings', 'pin_hash')
 

backend/alembic/versions/024_totp_mfa_tables.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""TOTP MFA: create totp_usage and backup_codes tables.
+
+Revision ID: 024
+Revises: 023
+Create Date: 2026-02-25
+
+Note: totp_secret and totp_enabled columns are already on the users table
+from migration 023 — this migration only adds the support tables.
+"""
+from alembic import op
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+revision = "024"
+down_revision = "023"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # --- totp_usage: tracks used TOTP codes for replay prevention ---
+    op.create_table(
+        "totp_usage",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "user_id",
+            sa.Integer(),
+            sa.ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.Column("code", sa.String(6), nullable=False),
+        # The actual TOTP time window (floor(unix_time / 30)) that matched
+        sa.Column("window", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "used_at",
+            sa.DateTime(),
+            server_default=sa.text("NOW()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        # Unique on (user_id, code, window) — not just (user_id, window) — see model comment
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("user_id", "code", "window", name="uq_totp_user_code_window"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_totp_usage_user_id", "totp_usage", ["user_id"])
+
+    # --- backup_codes: hashed recovery codes (Argon2id) ---
+    op.create_table(
+        "backup_codes",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column(
+            "user_id",
+            sa.Integer(),
+            sa.ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        # Argon2id hash of the plaintext recovery code
+        sa.Column("code_hash", sa.String(255), nullable=False),
+        # Null until redeemed
+        sa.Column("used_at", sa.DateTime(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column(
+            "created_at",
+            sa.DateTime(),
+            server_default=sa.text("NOW()"),
+            nullable=False,
+        ),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_backup_codes_user_id", "backup_codes", ["user_id"])
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_index("ix_backup_codes_user_id", table_name="backup_codes")
+    op.drop_table("backup_codes")
+    op.drop_index("ix_totp_usage_user_id", table_name="totp_usage")
+    op.drop_table("totp_usage")

backend/app/jobs/notifications.py

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ from app.models.calendar_event import CalendarEvent
 from app.models.todo import Todo
 from app.models.project import Project
 from app.models.ntfy_sent import NtfySent
+from app.models.totp_usage import TOTPUsage
+from app.models.session import UserSession
 from app.services.ntfy import send_ntfy_notification
 from app.services.ntfy_templates import (
     build_event_notification,
@@ -211,6 +213,19 @@ async def _purge_old_sent_records(db: AsyncSession) -> None:
     await db.commit()
 
 
+async def _purge_totp_usage(db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+    """Remove TOTP usage records older than 5 minutes — they serve no purpose beyond replay prevention."""
+    cutoff = datetime.now() - timedelta(minutes=5)
+    await db.execute(delete(TOTPUsage).where(TOTPUsage.used_at < cutoff))
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+async def _purge_expired_sessions(db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+    """Remove expired UserSession rows to keep the sessions table lean."""
+    await db.execute(delete(UserSession).where(UserSession.expires_at < datetime.now()))
+    await db.commit()
+
+
 # ── Entry point ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 async def run_notification_dispatch() -> None:
@@ -242,6 +257,11 @@ async def run_notification_dispatch() -> None:
             # Daily housekeeping: purge stale dedup records
             await _purge_old_sent_records(db)
 
+        # Security housekeeping runs every cycle regardless of ntfy_enabled
+        async with AsyncSessionLocal() as db:
+            await _purge_totp_usage(db)
+            await _purge_expired_sessions(db)
+
     except Exception:
         # Broad catch: job failure must never crash the scheduler or the app
         logger.exception("ntfy dispatch job encountered an unhandled error")

backend/app/main.py

@@ -6,11 +6,14 @@ from apscheduler.schedulers.asyncio import AsyncIOScheduler
 
 from app.database import engine
 from app.routers import auth, todos, events, calendars, reminders, projects, people, locations, settings as settings_router, dashboard, weather, event_templates
+from app.routers import totp
 from app.jobs.notifications import run_notification_dispatch
 
 # Import models so Alembic's autogenerate can discover them
 from app.models import user as _user_model  # noqa: F401
 from app.models import session as _session_model  # noqa: F401
+from app.models import totp_usage as _totp_usage_model  # noqa: F401
+from app.models import backup_code as _backup_code_model  # noqa: F401
 
 
 @asynccontextmanager
@@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ app.include_router(settings_router.router, prefix="/api/settings", tags=["Settin
 app.include_router(dashboard.router, prefix="/api", tags=["Dashboard"])
 app.include_router(weather.router, prefix="/api/weather", tags=["Weather"])
 app.include_router(event_templates.router, prefix="/api/event-templates", tags=["Event Templates"])
+app.include_router(totp.router, prefix="/api/auth", tags=["TOTP MFA"])
 
 
 @app.get("/")

backend/app/models/__init__.py

@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ from app.models.project_task import ProjectTask
 from app.models.person import Person
 from app.models.location import Location
 from app.models.task_comment import TaskComment
+from app.models.user import User
+from app.models.session import UserSession
+from app.models.ntfy_sent import NtfySent
+from app.models.totp_usage import TOTPUsage
+from app.models.backup_code import BackupCode
 
 __all__ = [
     "Settings",
@@ -20,4 +25,9 @@ __all__ = [
     "Person",
     "Location",
     "TaskComment",
+    "User",
+    "UserSession",
+    "NtfySent",
+    "TOTPUsage",
+    "BackupCode",
 ]

backend/app/models/backup_code.py

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+from sqlalchemy import String, ForeignKey, func
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Optional
+from app.database import Base
+
+
+class BackupCode(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "backup_codes"
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(primary_key=True)
+    user_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(
+        ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    # Argon2id hash of the plaintext recovery code — never store plaintext
+    code_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(255), nullable=False)
+    # Null until redeemed; set to datetime.now() on successful use
+    used_at: Mapped[Optional[datetime]] = mapped_column(nullable=True, default=None)
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(default=func.now())

backend/app/models/settings.py

@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ class Settings(Base):
 
     id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(primary_key=True, index=True)
 
-    # FK to users table — nullable during migration, will be NOT NULL after data migration
-    user_id: Mapped[Optional[int]] = mapped_column(
+    # FK to users table — NOT NULL enforced by migration 023 after data backfill
+    user_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(
         ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
-        nullable=True,
+        nullable=False,
         index=True,
     )
 

backend/app/models/totp_usage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+from sqlalchemy import String, Integer, ForeignKey, UniqueConstraint, func
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+from datetime import datetime
+from app.database import Base
+
+
+class TOTPUsage(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "totp_usage"
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(primary_key=True)
+    user_id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(
+        ForeignKey("users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    # The 6-digit code that was used
+    code: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(6), nullable=False)
+    # The TOTP time window in which the code was valid (floor(unix_time / 30))
+    window: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False)
+    used_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(default=func.now())
+
+    # NOTE on replay prevention design:
+    # The unique constraint is on (user_id, code, window) — NOT (user_id, window).
+    # This allows a user to present the T-1 window code and then the T window code
+    # consecutively — these are different 6-digit OTPs, so both should succeed.
+    # Constraining only (user_id, window) would reject the second legitimate code.
+    # The actual attack we prevent is reusing the *same code string in the same window*,
+    # which is the only true replay. This is compliant with RFC 6238 §5.2.
+    # The 5-minute MFA token expiry provides the outer time bound on any abuse window.
+    __table_args__ = (
+        UniqueConstraint("user_id", "code", "window", name="uq_totp_user_code_window"),
+    )

backend/app/routers/dashboard.py

@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ _not_parent_template = or_(
 async def get_dashboard(
     client_date: Optional[date] = Query(None),
     db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
-    current_user: Settings = Depends(get_current_settings)
+    current_settings: Settings = Depends(get_current_settings)
 ):
     """Get aggregated dashboard data."""
     today = client_date or date.today()
-    upcoming_cutoff = today + timedelta(days=current_user.upcoming_days)
+    upcoming_cutoff = today + timedelta(days=current_settings.upcoming_days)
 
     # Today's events (exclude parent templates — they are hidden, children are shown)
     today_start = datetime.combine(today, datetime.min.time())
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ async def get_upcoming(
     days: int = Query(default=7, ge=1, le=90),
     client_date: Optional[date] = Query(None),
     db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
-    current_user: Settings = Depends(get_current_settings)
+    current_settings: Settings = Depends(get_current_settings)
 ):
     """Get unified list of upcoming items (todos, events, reminders) sorted by date."""
     today = client_date or date.today()

backend/app/routers/totp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
+"""
+TOTP MFA router.
+
+Endpoints (all under /api/auth — registered in main.py with prefix="/api/auth"):
+
+  POST /totp/setup               — Generate secret + QR + backup codes (auth required)
+  POST /totp/confirm             — Verify first code, enable TOTP (auth required)
+  POST /totp-verify              — MFA challenge: mfa_token + TOTP/backup code, issues session
+  POST /totp/disable             — Disable TOTP (auth required, needs password + code)
+  POST /totp/backup-codes/regenerate — Regenerate backup codes (auth required, needs password + code)
+  GET  /totp/status              — { enabled, backup_codes_remaining } (auth required)
+
+Security:
+  - TOTP secrets encrypted at rest (Fernet/AES-128-CBC, key derived from SECRET_KEY)
+  - Replay prevention via totp_usage table (unique on user_id+code+window)
+  - Backup codes hashed with Argon2id, shown plaintext once only
+  - Failed TOTP attempts increment user.failed_login_count (shared lockout counter)
+  - totp-verify uses mfa_token (not session cookie) — user is not yet authenticated
+"""
+import uuid
+import secrets
+import logging
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+from typing import Optional
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+from sqlalchemy import select, delete
+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.models.user import User
+from app.models.session import UserSession
+from app.models.totp_usage import TOTPUsage
+from app.models.backup_code import BackupCode
+from app.routers.auth import get_current_user, _set_session_cookie
+from app.services.auth import (
+    verify_password_with_upgrade,
+    hash_password,
+    verify_mfa_token,
+    create_session_token,
+)
+from app.services.totp import (
+    generate_totp_secret,
+    encrypt_totp_secret,
+    decrypt_totp_secret,
+    get_totp_uri,
+    verify_totp_code,
+    generate_qr_base64,
+    generate_backup_codes,
+)
+from app.config import settings as app_settings
+
+# Argon2id for backup code hashing — treat each code like a password
+from argon2 import PasswordHasher
+from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError, VerificationError, InvalidHashError
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+router = APIRouter()
+
+# Argon2id instance for backup code hashes (same params as password hashing)
+_ph = PasswordHasher(
+    time_cost=2,
+    memory_cost=19456,
+    parallelism=1,
+    hash_len=32,
+    salt_len=16,
+)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Request schemas
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+class TOTPConfirmRequest(BaseModel):
+    code: str
+
+
+class TOTPVerifyRequest(BaseModel):
+    mfa_token: str
+    code: Optional[str] = None        # 6-digit TOTP code
+    backup_code: Optional[str] = None  # Alternative: XXXX-XXXX backup code
+
+
+class TOTPDisableRequest(BaseModel):
+    password: str
+    code: str  # Current TOTP code required to disable
+
+
+class BackupCodesRegenerateRequest(BaseModel):
+    password: str
+    code: str  # Current TOTP code required to regenerate
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Internal helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+async def _store_backup_codes(db: AsyncSession, user_id: int, plaintext_codes: list[str]) -> None:
+    """Hash and insert backup codes for the given user."""
+    for code in plaintext_codes:
+        code_hash = _ph.hash(code)
+        db.add(BackupCode(user_id=user_id, code_hash=code_hash))
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+async def _delete_backup_codes(db: AsyncSession, user_id: int) -> None:
+    """Delete all backup codes for a user."""
+    await db.execute(delete(BackupCode).where(BackupCode.user_id == user_id))
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+async def _verify_backup_code(
+    db: AsyncSession, user_id: int, submitted_code: str
+) -> bool:
+    """
+    Check submitted backup code against all unused hashes for the user.
+    On match, marks the code as used. Returns True if a valid unused code was found.
+    Uses Argon2id verification — constant-time by design.
+    """
+    result = await db.execute(
+        select(BackupCode).where(
+            BackupCode.user_id == user_id,
+            BackupCode.used_at.is_(None),
+        )
+    )
+    unused_codes = result.scalars().all()
+
+    for record in unused_codes:
+        try:
+            if _ph.verify(record.code_hash, submitted_code):
+                record.used_at = datetime.now()
+                await db.commit()
+                return True
+        except (VerifyMismatchError, VerificationError, InvalidHashError):
+            continue
+
+    return False
+
+
+async def _create_full_session(
+    db: AsyncSession,
+    user: User,
+    request: Request,
+) -> str:
+    """Create a UserSession row and return the signed cookie token."""
+    session_id = uuid.uuid4().hex
+    expires_at = datetime.now() + timedelta(days=app_settings.SESSION_MAX_AGE_DAYS)
+    ip = request.client.host if request.client else None
+    user_agent = request.headers.get("user-agent")
+
+    db_session = UserSession(
+        id=session_id,
+        user_id=user.id,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        ip_address=ip[:45] if ip else None,
+        user_agent=(user_agent or "")[:255] if user_agent else None,
+    )
+    db.add(db_session)
+    await db.commit()
+    return create_session_token(user.id, session_id)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Routes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+@router.post("/totp/setup")
+async def totp_setup(
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+):
+    """
+    Generate a new TOTP secret, QR code, and backup codes.
+    Stores the encrypted secret with totp_enabled=False until confirmed.
+
+    Idempotent: calling again before confirmation overwrites the unconfirmed secret,
+    so browser refreshes mid-setup generate a fresh QR without error.
+
+    Returns { secret, qr_code_base64, backup_codes } — the only time plaintext
+    values are shown. The `secret` field is the raw base32 for manual entry.
+    """
+    # Generate new secret (idempotent — overwrite any existing unconfirmed secret)
+    raw_secret = generate_totp_secret()
+    encrypted_secret = encrypt_totp_secret(raw_secret)
+
+    current_user.totp_secret = encrypted_secret
+    current_user.totp_enabled = False  # Not enabled until /confirm called
+
+    # Generate backup codes — hash before storage, return plaintext once
+    plaintext_codes = generate_backup_codes(10)
+    await _delete_backup_codes(db, current_user.id)  # Remove any previous unconfirmed codes
+    await _store_backup_codes(db, current_user.id, plaintext_codes)
+
+    await db.commit()
+
+    # Build QR code from provisioning URI
+    uri = get_totp_uri(encrypted_secret, current_user.username)
+    qr_base64 = generate_qr_base64(uri)
+
+    return {
+        "secret": raw_secret,           # Raw base32 for manual authenticator entry
+        "qr_code_base64": qr_base64,    # PNG QR code, data:image/png;base64,...
+        "backup_codes": plaintext_codes, # Shown once — user must save these
+    }
+
+
+@router.post("/totp/confirm")
+async def totp_confirm(
+    data: TOTPConfirmRequest,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+):
+    """
+    Verify the first TOTP code from the authenticator app and enable TOTP.
+    Must be called after /setup while totp_enabled is still False.
+    """
+    if not current_user.totp_secret:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="TOTP setup not started — call /setup first")
+
+    if current_user.totp_enabled:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="TOTP is already enabled")
+
+    matched_window = verify_totp_code(current_user.totp_secret, data.code)
+    if matched_window is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid code — check your authenticator app time sync")
+
+    current_user.totp_enabled = True
+    await db.commit()
+
+    return {"message": "TOTP enabled successfully"}
+
+
+@router.post("/totp-verify")
+async def totp_verify(
+    data: TOTPVerifyRequest,
+    request: Request,
+    response: Response,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+):
+    """
+    MFA challenge endpoint — called after a successful password login when TOTP is enabled.
+    Accepts either a 6-digit TOTP code or a backup recovery code.
+
+    Uses the short-lived mfa_token (from POST /login) instead of a session cookie
+    because the user is not yet fully authenticated at this stage.
+
+    On success: issues a full session cookie and returns { authenticated: true }.
+    """
+    if not data.code and not data.backup_code:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail="Provide either 'code' or 'backup_code'")
+
+    # Validate the MFA challenge token (5-minute TTL)
+    user_id = verify_mfa_token(data.mfa_token)
+    if user_id is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="MFA session expired — please log in again")
+
+    result = await db.execute(select(User).where(User.id == user_id, User.is_active == True))
+    user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
+    if not user:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="User not found or inactive")
+
+    if not user.totp_enabled or not user.totp_secret:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="TOTP not configured for this account")
+
+    # Check account lockout (shared counter with password failures)
+    if user.locked_until and datetime.now() < user.locked_until:
+        remaining = int((user.locked_until - datetime.now()).total_seconds() / 60) + 1
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=423,
+            detail=f"Account locked. Try again in {remaining} minutes.",
+        )
+
+    # --- Backup code path ---
+    if data.backup_code:
+        normalized = data.backup_code.strip().upper()
+        valid = await _verify_backup_code(db, user.id, normalized)
+        if not valid:
+            user.failed_login_count += 1
+            if user.failed_login_count >= 10:
+                user.locked_until = datetime.now() + timedelta(minutes=30)
+            await db.commit()
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid backup code")
+
+        # Backup code accepted — reset lockout counter and issue session
+        user.failed_login_count = 0
+        user.locked_until = None
+        user.last_login_at = datetime.now()
+        await db.commit()
+
+        token = await _create_full_session(db, user, request)
+        _set_session_cookie(response, token)
+        return {"authenticated": True}
+
+    # --- TOTP code path ---
+    matched_window = verify_totp_code(user.totp_secret, data.code)
+    if matched_window is None:
+        user.failed_login_count += 1
+        if user.failed_login_count >= 10:
+            user.locked_until = datetime.now() + timedelta(minutes=30)
+        await db.commit()
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid code")
+
+    # Replay prevention — record (user_id, code, actual_matching_window)
+    totp_record = TOTPUsage(user_id=user.id, code=data.code, window=matched_window)
+    db.add(totp_record)
+    try:
+        await db.commit()
+    except IntegrityError:
+        await db.rollback()
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Code already used — wait for the next code")
+
+    # Success — reset lockout counter, update last_login_at, issue full session
+    user.failed_login_count = 0
+    user.locked_until = None
+    user.last_login_at = datetime.now()
+    await db.commit()
+
+    token = await _create_full_session(db, user, request)
+    _set_session_cookie(response, token)
+    return {"authenticated": True}
+
+
+@router.post("/totp/disable")
+async def totp_disable(
+    data: TOTPDisableRequest,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+):
+    """
+    Disable TOTP for the current user.
+    Requires both current password AND a valid TOTP code as confirmation.
+    Clears totp_secret, sets totp_enabled=False, and deletes all backup codes.
+    """
+    if not current_user.totp_enabled:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="TOTP is not enabled")
+
+    # Verify password (handles bcrypt→Argon2id upgrade transparently)
+    valid, new_hash = verify_password_with_upgrade(data.password, current_user.password_hash)
+    if not valid:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid password")
+
+    if new_hash:
+        current_user.password_hash = new_hash
+
+    # Verify TOTP code — both checks required for disable
+    matched_window = verify_totp_code(current_user.totp_secret, data.code)
+    if matched_window is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid TOTP code")
+
+    # All checks passed — disable TOTP
+    current_user.totp_secret = None
+    current_user.totp_enabled = False
+    await _delete_backup_codes(db, current_user.id)
+    await db.commit()
+
+    return {"message": "TOTP disabled successfully"}
+
+
+@router.post("/totp/backup-codes/regenerate")
+async def regenerate_backup_codes(
+    data: BackupCodesRegenerateRequest,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+):
+    """
+    Regenerate backup recovery codes.
+    Requires current password AND a valid TOTP code.
+    Deletes all existing backup codes and generates 10 fresh ones.
+    Returns plaintext codes once — never retrievable again.
+    """
+    if not current_user.totp_enabled:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="TOTP is not enabled")
+
+    valid, new_hash = verify_password_with_upgrade(data.password, current_user.password_hash)
+    if not valid:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid password")
+
+    if new_hash:
+        current_user.password_hash = new_hash
+        await db.commit()
+
+    matched_window = verify_totp_code(current_user.totp_secret, data.code)
+    if matched_window is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid TOTP code")
+
+    # Regenerate
+    plaintext_codes = generate_backup_codes(10)
+    await _delete_backup_codes(db, current_user.id)
+    await _store_backup_codes(db, current_user.id, plaintext_codes)
+
+    return {"backup_codes": plaintext_codes}
+
+
+@router.get("/totp/status")
+async def totp_status(
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
+):
+    """Return TOTP enabled state and count of remaining (unused) backup codes."""
+    remaining = 0
+    if current_user.totp_enabled:
+        result = await db.execute(
+            select(BackupCode).where(
+                BackupCode.user_id == current_user.id,
+                BackupCode.used_at.is_(None),
+            )
+        )
+        remaining = len(result.scalars().all())
+
+    return {
+        "enabled": current_user.totp_enabled,
+        "backup_codes_remaining": remaining,
+    }

backend/app/services/totp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+"""
+TOTP service: secret generation/encryption, code verification, QR code generation,
+backup code generation.
+
+All TOTP secrets are Fernet-encrypted at rest using a key derived from SECRET_KEY.
+Raw secrets are never logged and are only returned to the client once (at setup).
+"""
+import pyotp
+import secrets
+import string
+import time
+import io
+import base64
+import hashlib
+
+import qrcode
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from app.config import settings as app_settings
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fernet key derivation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def _get_fernet() -> Fernet:
+    """Derive a 32-byte Fernet key from SECRET_KEY via SHA-256."""
+    key = hashlib.sha256(app_settings.SECRET_KEY.encode()).digest()
+    return Fernet(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(key))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Secret management
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def generate_totp_secret() -> str:
+    """Generate a new random TOTP secret (base32, ~160 bits entropy)."""
+    return pyotp.random_base32()
+
+
+def encrypt_totp_secret(raw: str) -> str:
+    """Encrypt a raw TOTP secret before storing in the DB."""
+    return _get_fernet().encrypt(raw.encode()).decode()
+
+
+def decrypt_totp_secret(encrypted: str) -> str:
+    """Decrypt a TOTP secret retrieved from the DB."""
+    return _get_fernet().decrypt(encrypted.encode()).decode()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Provisioning URI and QR code
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def get_totp_uri(encrypted_secret: str, username: str) -> str:
+    """Return the otpauth:// provisioning URI for QR code generation."""
+    raw = decrypt_totp_secret(encrypted_secret)
+    totp = pyotp.TOTP(raw)
+    return totp.provisioning_uri(name=username, issuer_name=app_settings.TOTP_ISSUER)
+
+
+def generate_qr_base64(uri: str) -> str:
+    """Return a base64-encoded PNG of the QR code for the provisioning URI."""
+    qr = qrcode.QRCode(
+        version=1,
+        error_correction=qrcode.constants.ERROR_CORRECT_L,
+        box_size=10,
+        border=4,
+    )
+    qr.add_data(uri)
+    qr.make(fit=True)
+    img = qr.make_image(fill_color="black", back_color="white")
+    buf = io.BytesIO()
+    img.save(buf, format="PNG")
+    return base64.b64encode(buf.getvalue()).decode()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Code verification
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def verify_totp_code(encrypted_secret: str, code: str, valid_window: int = 1) -> int | None:
+    """
+    Verify a TOTP code and return the matching time window, or None if invalid.
+
+    Checks each window individually (T-valid_window ... T+valid_window) so the
+    caller knows WHICH window matched — required for correct replay-prevention
+    (the TOTPUsage row must record the actual matching window, not the current one).
+
+    Uses secrets.compare_digest for constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
+
+    Returns:
+        int  — the floor(unix_time / 30) window value that matched
+        None — no window matched (invalid code)
+    """
+    raw = decrypt_totp_secret(encrypted_secret)
+    totp = pyotp.TOTP(raw)
+    current_window = int(time.time() // 30)
+
+    for offset in range(-valid_window, valid_window + 1):
+        check_window = current_window + offset
+        # pyotp.at() accepts a unix timestamp; multiply window back to seconds
+        expected_code = totp.at(check_window * 30)
+        if secrets.compare_digest(code.strip(), expected_code):
+            return check_window  # Return the ACTUAL window that matched
+
+    return None  # No window matched
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Backup codes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def generate_backup_codes(count: int = 10) -> list[str]:
+    """
+    Generate recovery backup codes in XXXX-XXXX format.
+    Uses cryptographically secure randomness (secrets module).
+    """
+    alphabet = string.ascii_uppercase + string.digits
+    return [
+        "".join(secrets.choice(alphabet) for _ in range(4))
+        + "-"
+        + "".join(secrets.choice(alphabet) for _ in range(4))
+        for _ in range(count)
+    ]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Utility
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def get_totp_window() -> int:
+    """Return the current TOTP time window (floor(unix_time / 30))."""
+    return int(time.time() // 30)

backend/requirements.txt

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ pydantic==2.10.4
 pydantic-settings==2.7.1
 bcrypt==4.2.1
 argon2-cffi>=23.1.0
+pyotp>=2.9.0
+qrcode[pil]>=7.4.0
+cryptography>=42.0.0
 python-multipart==0.0.20
 python-dateutil==2.9.0
 itsdangerous==2.2.0

frontend/src/components/auth/LockScreen.tsx

@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ export default function LockScreen() {
                     id="username"
                     type="text"
                     value={username}
-                    onChange={(e) => setUsername(e.target.value)}
+                    onChange={(e) => { setUsername(e.target.value); setLockoutMessage(null); }}
                     placeholder="Enter username"
                     required
                     autoFocus
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ export default function LockScreen() {
                     id="password"
                     type="password"
                     value={password}
-                    onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
+                    onChange={(e) => { setPassword(e.target.value); setLockoutMessage(null); }}
                     placeholder={isSetup ? 'Create a password' : 'Enter password'}
                     required
                     autoComplete={isSetup ? 'new-password' : 'current-password'}

frontend/src/components/settings/NtfySettingsSection.tsx

@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ export default function NtfySettingsSection({ settings, updateSettings }: NtfySe
   const [showToken, setShowToken] = useState(false);
 
   // Per-type toggles
-  const [eventsEnabled, setEventsEnabled] = useState(false);
+  const [eventsEnabled, setEventsEnabled] = useState(true);
   const [eventLeadMinutes, setEventLeadMinutes] = useState(15);
-  const [remindersEnabled, setRemindersEnabled] = useState(false);
-  const [todosEnabled, setTodosEnabled] = useState(false);
-  const [todoLeadDays, setTodoLeadDays] = useState(0);
-  const [projectsEnabled, setProjectsEnabled] = useState(false);
-  const [projectLeadDays, setProjectLeadDays] = useState(0);
+  const [remindersEnabled, setRemindersEnabled] = useState(true);
+  const [todosEnabled, setTodosEnabled] = useState(true);
+  const [todoLeadDays, setTodoLeadDays] = useState(1);
+  const [projectsEnabled, setProjectsEnabled] = useState(true);
+  const [projectLeadDays, setProjectLeadDays] = useState(2);
 
   const [isSaving, setIsSaving] = useState(false);
   const [isTestingNtfy, setIsTestingNtfy] = useState(false);