UMBRA/frontend/nginx.conf
Kyle Pope 44e6c8e3e5 Fix 3 pentest findings: lockout status disclosure, timing side-channel, XFF trust scope
F-01 (passkeys.py): Add constant-time DB no-op on login/begin when username not
found. Without it the absent credential-fetch query makes the "no user" path
measurably faster, leaking username existence via timing.

F-02 (session.py, auth.py, passkeys.py, totp.py): Change check_account_lockout
from HTTP 423 to 401 — status-code analysis can no longer distinguish a locked
account from an invalid credential. record_failed_login now returns remaining
attempt count; callers use it for progressive UX warnings (<=3 attempts left,
and on the locking attempt) without changing the 401 status code visible to
attackers. Session-lock 423 path in get_current_user is unaffected.

F-03 (nginx.conf): Replace set_real_ip_from 0.0.0.0/0 with RFC 1918 ranges
(172.16.0.0/12, 10.0.0.0/8) to prevent external clients from spoofing
X-Forwarded-For to bypass rate limiting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18 01:01:19 +08:00

193 lines
7.8 KiB
Nginx Configuration File

# Rate limiting zones (before server block)
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=auth_limit:10m rate=10r/m;
# SEC-14: Registration endpoint — slightly more permissive than strict auth endpoints
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=register_limit:10m rate=5r/m;
# Admin API — generous for legitimate use but still guards against scraping/brute-force
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=admin_limit:10m rate=30r/m;
# Calendar sharing endpoints
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=cal_invite_limit:10m rate=5r/m;
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=cal_sync_limit:10m rate=15r/m;
# Connection endpoints — prevent search enumeration and request spam
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=conn_search_limit:10m rate=10r/m;
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=conn_request_limit:10m rate=3r/m;
# Event creation — recurrence amplification means 1 POST = up to 90-365 child rows
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=event_create_limit:10m rate=30r/m;
# Use X-Forwarded-Proto from upstream proxy when present, fall back to $scheme for direct access
map $http_x_forwarded_proto $forwarded_proto {
default $scheme;
https https;
http http;
}
server {
listen 8080;
server_name localhost;
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Suppress nginx version in Server header
server_tokens off;
# ── Real client IP restoration (PT-01 / F-03) ─────────────────────
# Pangolin (TLS-terminating reverse proxy) connects via Docker bridge.
# Restore the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For so that limit_req_zone
# (which keys on $binary_remote_addr) throttles per-client, not per-proxy.
# Restricted to RFC 1918 ranges only — trusting 0.0.0.0/0 would allow an
# external client to spoof X-Forwarded-For and bypass rate limiting (F-03).
set_real_ip_from 172.16.0.0/12;
set_real_ip_from 10.0.0.0/8;
real_ip_header X-Forwarded-For;
real_ip_recursive on;
# Gzip compression
gzip on;
gzip_vary on;
gzip_min_length 1024;
gzip_types text/plain text/css text/xml text/javascript application/x-javascript application/xml+rss application/javascript application/json image/svg+xml;
# Block dotfiles (except .well-known for ACME/Let's Encrypt) (PT-04)
location ~ /\.(?!well-known) {
default_type application/json;
return 404 '{"detail":"Not Found"}';
}
# Rate-limited auth endpoints (keep in sync with proxy-params.conf)
location /api/auth/login {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
location /api/auth/verify-password {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
location /api/auth/totp-verify {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
location /api/auth/change-password {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
location /api/auth/setup {
# Tighter burst: setup is one-time-only, 3 attempts is sufficient
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=3 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Passkey authentication — rate-limited (C-04)
location /api/auth/passkeys/login/begin {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
location /api/auth/passkeys/login/complete {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Passkey registration — authenticated, lower burst
location /api/auth/passkeys/register/begin {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=3 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
location /api/auth/passkeys/register/complete {
limit_req zone=auth_limit burst=3 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# SEC-14: Rate-limit public registration endpoint
location /api/auth/register {
limit_req zone=register_limit burst=3 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Connection search — rate-limited to prevent user enumeration
location /api/connections/search {
limit_req zone=conn_search_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Connection request (send) — exact match to avoid catching /requests/*
location = /api/connections/request {
limit_req zone=conn_request_limit burst=3 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Calendar invite — rate-limited to prevent invite spam
location ~ /api/shared-calendars/\d+/invite {
limit_req zone=cal_invite_limit burst=3 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Calendar sync — rate-limited to prevent excessive polling
location /api/shared-calendars/sync {
limit_req zone=cal_sync_limit burst=5 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Admin API — rate-limited separately from general /api traffic
location /api/admin/ {
limit_req zone=admin_limit burst=10 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# Event creation — rate-limited to prevent DB flooding via recurrence amplification.
# Note: exact match applies to GET+POST; 30r/m with burst=10 is generous enough
# for polling (2r/m) and won't affect reads even with multiple tabs.
location = /api/events {
limit_req zone=event_create_limit burst=10 nodelay;
limit_req_status 429;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# API proxy (catch-all for non-rate-limited endpoints)
location /api {
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection 'upgrade';
proxy_cache_bypass $http_upgrade;
include /etc/nginx/proxy-params.conf;
}
# SPA fallback - serve index.html for all routes
location / {
try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
}
# Cache static assets
location ~* \.(js|css|png|jpg|jpeg|gif|ico|svg|woff|woff2|ttf|eot)$ {
expires 1y;
add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable";
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; connect-src 'self';" always;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
}
# Security headers
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; connect-src 'self';" always;
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
# PT-I03: Restrict unnecessary browser APIs
add_header Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=(), publickey-credentials-get=(self), publickey-credentials-create=(self)" always;
}